Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis Revisited

Several studies have examined whether economic development causes democracy. This paper extends Burkhart and Lewis-Beck’s (1994) study in light of theoretical challenges to their findings and an increasing number of democracies since the late 1980s. I test whether economic development, world position and whether a nation-state is an oil country affect whether a country is more likely to be a democratic. I estimate my model on data from 180 nation-states with cross- sectional time series data from 1972 to 1995. I discover that a country is more likely to be a democracy as it economically develops. Further, semi-peripheral, peripheral and oil countries are less likely to be democracies. Finally, my findings hold regardless of how I measure democracy and after controlling for heteroskedasticity as well as spatial and temporal dependence. To know about the “Keshvanand Bharti Case”.

Political scientists have long suspected that a relationship exists between economic development and democracy. One reason offered for this connection is that the populace’s demand for democracy grows as their country becomes economically better off because such development can spread authority and democratic aspirations over a wide range of people (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Dahl 1989; Huntington 1991). Also, increased economic development should foster democracy because nondemocracies that partly develop may change their political systems because they are able to afford the costs that go along with having a democratic system.1

Along these lines, many have argued that nation-states that economically develop are more likely to be democracies (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Feng 1997; Jackman 1973; Leblang 1997; Lipset 1959, 1994). Others argue that peripheral and semiperipheral countries are less likely to be democracies than core countries (Bollen 1983; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Snyder and Kick 1979; Wallerstein 1974). Finally, some suggest that oil countries are less likely to be democracies (Barro 1999; Smith 2004).

Background

Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) test whether economic development causes economic development. Through a pooled, cross-sectional analysis of 131 nation-states from 1972 to 1989, they discover that countries which are more economically developed are more likely to be democracies. Also, they find that this relationship partly depends on that state’s position in the world system. Finally, they learn from Grainger’s (1969, 1988) tests on their data that economic development “causes” democracy, not the other way around.

Since Lewis-Beck and Burkhart’s (1994) published their article, their thesis has generated considerable debate amongst scholars who study the relationship between economics and democracy. For example, Rice and Ling (2002) argue that proponents of the economic development thesis give little thought to how culture relates to the relationship between economics and development. Using data from the 1990 World Values and the cumulative General Social surveys, Rice and Ling (2002) find that whether a country was a democracy in the 20th century depended more on social capital in the 1800s than 19th century economic development. To know about the “Nanavati Vs State of Maharashtra”.

However, two problems plague their study. First, they employ measures of social capital that “stack the deck” in favor of a statistically significant relationship between social capital and

democracy. We see such an effect because they perform an ex post analysis by using contemporary data as a historical measure of social capital.2 Second, Jackman and Miller (1996a, 1996b) employ measures of social capital that circumvent the ex post problem and discover little evidence that yields a systematic relationship between political culture and political and economic performance (Jackman and Miller 1996a, 653).

Other scholars argue that researchers should distinguish between exogenous and endogenous theories with respect to the relationship between economic development and democracy.

Endogenous explanations say that countries which continue to economically develop are more likely to be democracies (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). Conversely, exogenous theories argue that countries establish democracies independent of economic development. However, democracies are more likely to survive in developed countries (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). These researchers argue that once we disentangle these explanations, support for endogenous explanations falls away in favor of exogenous ones.

Oil Countries and Democracy

Finally, oil countries fundamentally differ from those nation-states that are not major oil exporters because such countries tend to be one party states or ruled by some kind of monarch (Herb 2004; Huntington 2004). Oil countries are more likely to have such political structures because the wealth that oil sales generate goes to the government and/or to multinational corporations who have operations in those countries (Barro 1999; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). Further, governments of oil countries rarely redistribute their wealth to the population that lives in these countries (Barro 1999). Since we know that countries that rarely redistribute their wealth are less likely to be democracies (see Gasiorowski 1995), I anticipate that:

Data and Methods

My data focuses on 180 countries from 1972 to 1995 and describes the degree to which each country is a democracy. My dependent variable is each nation-state’s democracy score from 1972 to 1995. Since researchers disagree about how to measure democracy, I use two different measures.5 First, I measure democracy using Polity III Scores for each country during this time period. Jaggers and Gurr (1995) coded their democracy rating from zero to ten, with higher rankings assigned to more democratic states.6 Second, I measure democracy using Freedom House scores. This organization coded each country’s score from two to fourteen based on civil and political rights within a nation-state, with a lower score indicating a more democratic state. I rescaled these scores by reducing each by two to create a scale from zero to twelve. The intuitive meaning of these scores is the same as the original measurement in that a lower score still indicates a more democratic state. To get the latest news about law can visit the most popular site named: Law Planet.

My first independent variable is economic development. I use kilowatt hours of electricity consumption per capita to measure economic development.8 I acquired data for this variable from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM (1998). I took the natural log of the values for each country in every year for two reasons. First, "… the relationship between development and the independent variables is quite useful in predicting the value of my dependent variable.

Discussion and Conclusion

I measured my dependent variable using Polity and Freedom House scores and found that countries are more likely to be democracies as they economically develop. I have three possible explanations for my finding. First, people within economically developing societies are more likely to demand democracy. Second, economic development creates more resources for the government and other actors to distribute to social groups. These groups must work with one another to determine how they plan to allocate the resources. Finally, economic development affects other factors that push a nation-state into becoming a democracy — like education and interpersonal trust (Huntington 1991; Lipset 1959; Putnam 1993).

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